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Background: Product counterfeiting is growing in scope, scale, and threat. This includes awareness of deceptive and
non-deceptive counterfeiting types. (This paper does not consider copyright or digital piracy, currency counterfeiting,
fraudulent documents, or artwork forgery.) In response, many organizations are focusing on product counterfeiting
including INTERPOL, International Standards Organization, World Health Organization, World Customs Organization, and
the U.S. Department of Justice. The goal of this research is to help brand owners and agencies efficiently select
appropriate countermeasures including overt, covert and forensic packaging features, as well as functions of market
monitoring, modifying supply chains, enforcement, prosecution and legislation.
Methods: To understand how product counterfeiting is perceived, researched, and categorized we reviewed
previous work in criminology, packaging science, behavioral science, supply chain management, economics, and
business management.
Results: We use this collective literature to develop a typology of product counterfeiters, counterfeiting, and
offender groups.
Conclusions: It is important to understand that anti-counterfeit strategies must be based on understanding the
nature of the fraud and the fraudster. Developing a typology is common practice in criminology and is no less
important for product counterfeiting. The concepts in this paper provide a typology to help organize a complex
set of information. This assists in explaining the opportunity structure of the problem based on the type of
counterfeiting, counterfeiter, and offender organization.
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Product counterfeiting is growing in scope, scale, and
threat (FDA, 2010, FDA, 2006, WCO, 2007a, WHO, 2007,
OECD, 2007b, Interpol 2007). This growth emphasizes the
need for anti-counterfeit strategies that protect consumers
and corporations alike. A critical first step in an anti-
counterfeit strategy is developing a typology to define the
different types of counterfeiters, counterfeiting, and of-
fender groups. Better understanding each of these ele-
ments is consistent with the crime science perspective,
which emphasizes the importance of crime events and
criminal opportunities (Clarke, 1997; Clarke, 2004; Eck,
1993; Eck, 2003). Once a product counterfeit opportunity* Correspondence: Spinkj@msu.edu
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in any medium, provided the original work is pis identified—either an actual incident by a company, an
incident at a competitor, or an awareness of vulnerability—
optimal countermeasures can be determined and selected.
While there is familiarity of package security for anti-
theft or anti-tamper tactics, often the core anti-counterfeit
strategy is unknown or undefined (Spink et al., 2011,
Spink, 2012). Only by understanding the full opportunity
structurea of the infringement, through a new focus on the
offender and the details of the infringement, can effective
countermeasures be selected that can deter or aid detec-
tion of similar infringements. Selecting optimal counter-
measures can avoid unproductive effort, minimize costs,
more quickly reduce the opportunities, and hopefully
provide a longer lasting deterrent effect. For example, a
branded toothpaste violating the trademark; generic auto-
mobile parts that violates a design patent or a brandedopen access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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well as a patented, proprietary cap designs. This paper does
not consider copyright or digital piracy, currency counter-
feiting, fraudulent documents, or artwork forgery. The
concepts are referred more generally to fraud rather than
crime since the infringement is often not a violation of a
criminal statute—in some countries, jurisdictions, or with
some products the act maybe not be technically a crime or,
if considering local norms, maybe not even unethical.
This paper begins with an overview of product coun-
terfeiting and strategic business countermeasures. There
is confusion of terms and objectives in the area of prod-
uct counterfeiting so this background is necessary to es-
tablish a method for selecting countermeasures. This is
followed by a review of the different types of counter-
feiters, counterfeiting, and offender groups.
Background
While the quantitative estimates of product counterfeiting
are elusive (Spink and Fejes, 2012), there is a general agree-
ment that it is nearly 7 percent of world trade or over $600
billion (CIB, 1997, CIB, 2007). Furthermore, only 5-10% of
the counterfeit products would be considered luxury goods
(Phillips, 2005). Lost tax revenues can also be astronom-
ical. It is estimated that New York and Los Angeles annu-
ally lose $1 billion and almost $500 million, respectively, in
city tax revenue due to counterfeited products (New York
City Comptroller's Office, 2004, LACDC, 2007). There is
evidence that virtually every type of product has been
counterfeited, including infant formula, prescription drugs,
vaccines, consumer goods, luxury goods and aftermarket
parts for automobiles, aircraft, and nuclear power plants…
and even World Customs Organization (WCO) training
videos (WCO, 2007b, Hopkins et al., 2003). The public
health risks associated with counterfeiting are diverse. Ex-
amples include lethal amounts of melamine in infant for-
mula, carcinogenic Sudan Red food dye, medicines with
little or no active ingredients, aircraft replacement parts
that fail, and substandard electrical cords that catch fire
(Hopkins et al., 2003).
Methods
To understand how product counterfeiting is perceived,
researched, and categorized we reviewed previous work in
criminology, packaging science, behavioral science, supply
chain management, economics, and business management.
There were no human subjects involved in this re-
search so Institutional Review Board approval or engage-
ment was not needed.
Results and discussion
We use this collective literature to develop a typology
of product counterfeiters, counterfeiting, and offender
groups.There are a range of concepts that must be reviewed
before developing a typology of product counterfeiters,
counterfeiting, and offender groups.
New product development requires a holistic and all-
encompassing approach to effectively combat this broad
and deep threat. Product attributes must be considered in
the context of the supply chain and logistics network as
well as the consumption of the product and final disposal
or reuse of packaging materials (Spink et al., 2010). Vari-
ous costs, such as packaging material and labor, are
considered and compared with the potential risks of inad-
equate or ineffective packaging. If created in a holistic
manner, packaging optimizes benefits and mitigates all re-
lated risks (Spink, 2009a). Having an all-encompassing
awareness of the fraud opportunity is a prerequisite for
businesses and successful decision-makers and researchers
(Speier et al., 2011).
The same holistic awareness is required for those who
encounter or anticipate product counterfeiting and seek
optimal countermeasures. To achieve a holistic perspec-
tive, anti-counterfeiting researchers must first strive to
understand the opportunity structure of the crime and its
unique aspects before formulating packaging-based coun-
termeasures. This approach is consistent with scientific
realism, an epistemological approach that has utility for
criminology (see Eck and Liu, 2008, Pawson and Tilley,
1997, Page 2000, Heinonen, 2010). Broadly, realism em-
phasizes the need to understand how crime occurs, which
is informed by the opportunity structure of the processes
that leads to crime, in order to effectively prevent it.
Basic definitions
Understanding the opportunity structure of counterfeiting
begins with agreement on a basic definition. The World
Trade Organization (WTO) defines product counterfeiting
as: “Unauthorized representation of a registered trademark
carried on goods identical or similar to goods for which
the trademark is registered, with a view to deceiving the
purchaser into believing that he/she is buying the original
goods” (WTO, 2011). The key elements of this basic defin-
ition are if the product is similar and if there is deception
of the consumer.
There are, however, inconstancies among the various
definitions of product counterfeiting (WHO, 2007, COE,
2006, WIPO, 2008, WCO, 2007b, Collins, 2004). Each def-
inition variation is based on the root of the rules or laws.
For example, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and the World Health Organization (WHO) docu-
ments demonstrate the nuances of defining counterfeiting.
Their definitions are very similar, even to the extent of hav-
ing many of the same phrases (WHO, 2007, FDA, 2007, 21
U.S.C. 321, 2004). Both agree that counterfeiting deliber-
ately and fraudulently misrepresented the identity or the
source of products. The FDA definition of counterfeiting
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product intended for one market or sales channel shipped
to another.
Inconsistencies among definitions also occur due to the
variety of technical terminology. For example, the term
counterfeiting has two distinctly different uses. One is the
over-arching term for the general issue and another com-
mon use for the term is the specific infringement of intel-
lectual property rights regarding trademarks and patents
(FDA, 2004, OECD, 2007a). Other similar terms contrib-
ute to the definition issue, such as piracy, which is used
for unauthorized use of a copyrighted work such as a
movie, music, book, or computer software. Another term
that is sometimes synonymous with counterfeiter is fraud-
sterb. This term has been used to describe criminals com-
mitting counterfeiting activity (Dekieffer 2006, European
Commission, 2006a, PriceWaterhouseCooper, 2007, FBI,
2013).
Attempts to harmonize counterfeiting terminology are
occurring. For example, the International Standards
Organization (ISO) is currently finalizing fraud of mater-
ial goods terminology in Working Group 2 of Technical
Committee 247 Fraud Countermeasures and controls
(this does not include digital copyright piracy) (ISO,
2010). In many instances, the activity is not a crime (a
violation of criminal law), a civil violation (if the activity
is not contractually defined as unauthorized), or even
considered unethical in some cultures or situations. The
term fraudster may seem to be an informal term, which
has been gaining acceptance by practitioners and re-
searchers. The FDA, WHO, and ISO all refer to the base
activity as fraud, so the perpetrators are fraudsters. Con-
sidering the general reference to the act of fraud by ISO,
FDA and others, the term fraudster is the most appro-
priate and widely applicable term. To be consistent with
the general use of the term fraud and fraudster, the vul-
nerability is referred to as the fraud opportunity.
Cause and effect relationships
Understanding counterfeiting also includes awareness of
its opportunity structure including its cause and effect
relationships. This is important for business decision-
makers and researchers to understand regarding the po-
tential to deter and detect product counterfeiting. Cause
refers to the various motivations of counterfeiters to
commit a specific incidentc and effect includes the vari-
ous end results of their counterfeit crimes. While coun-
terfeiting is commonly motivated by economic gain that
deceives consumers, this does not comprehensively ex-
plain the cause and effect of all counterfeit crimes. For
example, the cause of food fraud is the deliberate adul-
teration of food for economic gain, including acts of ter-
rorism (Spink and Moyer, 2011b). The effect is not just
the simple economic deception of consumers but alsothe introduction of risks to public health (e.g., un-
declared allergens, toxic additives, etc.).
The strategic anti-counterfeiting concepts of reaction
and prevention are also important for business decision-
makers and researchers to understand. Reaction refers to
the events that occur after a counterfeit crime has been
perpetrated. From a law enforcement perspective this
would be enforcement and prosecution. From a food pro-
tection perspective this would be intervention and re-
sponse. The seizure or quarantining of suspect goods is an
example. Assessing the effectiveness of reactions to coun-
terfeit incidents can be invaluable in preventing future
counterfeit crimes. For example, incidents of melamine-
adulterated infant formula permanently changed the way
that protein-rich foods are screened (Moore et al., 2012).
When developing proactive intervention steps, the food
industry has adopted new test methods and it is now com-
mon practice to test for the melamine contaminant, which
in and of itself creates a deterrent. Fraudsters are deterred
from this type of fraud due to this improved and wide-
spread monitoring.
Applying situational crime prevention
In relation to product counterfeiting, it is important for
business decision-makers and researchers to understand
Cohen and Felson’s “chemistry of crime” and the “crime
triangle” (Cohen and Felson, 1979, as adapted by Spink
and Moyer, 2011a, Spink and Moyer, 2011b), which form
the basis of applied crime prevention, or situational
crime prevention (Clarke, 1980). An underlying theory
of situational crime prevention is routine activity theory,
which identifies the minimal elements that must con-
verge in space and time (i.e., a motivated offender, suit-
able victim and lack of capable guardianship) in order to
make crime possible (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Rational
choice, another perspective informing situational crime
prevention, introduces the concept of offender choice,
or the idea that such elements influence offender
decision-making during the planning and commission of
crime events (see Clarke and Cornish, 1985). Situational
crime prevention operates on the concept of offender
choice by identifying ways to manipulate immediate situ-
ations (based on the elements of routine activity theory)
so that offending appears less attractive.
Taken together, two basic constructs are critical to un-
derstanding and preventing crime events: the minimal ele-
ments of crime and offender choice (Heinonen, 2010).
Building on this, it is informative to consider the offenders,
victims and guardians (or lack thereof) (Felson and Clarke,
1997; Felson, 1998; Center for Problem-Oriented Policing,
2006) in product counterfeiting. The roles of counterfeiting
offender and victims are, in theory, intuitive. The role of
guardians need not be an individual, such as a law enforce-
ment officer, and could include standardized reference
Table 1 Criminal types and attributes applicable




Recreational Action for entertainment or amusement
Occasional Infrequent, opportunistic
Occupational Incidents at their place of employment either as an
individual act or in collaboration with the company
Professional Crime fully finances their lifestyle
Ideological Domestic or international terrorist who commits this
act to make an ideological statement or to
economically harm an entity
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supplier audits, or transparency created by quality control
programs. These dimensions are consistent with environ-
mental criminology and form the theoretical foundation of
the Counterfeiting Incident Cluster Tool.
Existing criminology typologies
In order to develop a typology for the study of counter-
feit offenders, counterfeiting, and offender groups, we
review existing, applicable, criminology typologies. For
example, Canter and Larkin (1993) made a fundamental
distinction between two types of serial criminal offender
in terms of the offender’s spatial behavior during the
execution of serial crimes. Marauders operate in an area
that is proximate to a home base while commuters com-
mit crimes in locations more distant from their place of
residence. Canter et al. (2003) created a typology of
stranger-rape (vs. acquaintance rape) that distinguishes
behavioral themes, such as hostile, controlling, stealing,
or involving, coupled with the different types of viola-
tions experienced by rape victims, ranging from personal
to physical violations. The composite model of stranger-
rape consists of the four behavioral themes as different
expressions of violation intensities. The typology model
has implications for the classification of rapes, the inves-
tigation and potential preventive countermeasures of
sexual attacks, and the treatment of victims.
Similarly, Holmes and DeBurger (1988) developed a
typology that divides serial killers into four broad types:
visionary, mission-oriented, hedonistic, and power/con-
trol. Those authors also noted that these are not defini-
tive categories as some serial killers may exhibit aspects
of each type at various times. This demonstrates that
while there is utility in developing typologies to describe
crimes and offenders, the approach can be challenged to
distinctly capture all of potential variation.
Defining the types of counterfeiters
Before characterizing crime or criminal acts, it is import-
ant to review and define associated terms. Van Dijk &
Waard (1991) emphasized that the typology of crime by
several dimensions, such as offenders, situation, and vic-
tims, can provide insight to systematic countermeasures
for specific crime problems. For example, a typology of
frauds and fraudsters provides insight to the nature of spe-
cific fraud crimes and fraud offenders. Insight regarding
potential countermeasures is also gained by understanding
and classifying (clustering) the specific characteristics of
each type fraud and fraudster.
Criminology provides the basis for understanding the
offenders who are various types of counterfeiters. This is
consistent with Clarke’s crime science approach (Clarke,
2004) that focuses on understanding how crime events
occur, which may vary by the type of offender and theirtechniques. Definitions from criminology emphasize the
various types of offenders (i.e. offender-based) rather
than their unique offenses (i.e. offense-based). There are
several different types of criminals presented in Table 1
that fit the actions of counterfeiters including recre-
ational, occasional, occupational, professional, and ideo-
logical ((Spink et al., 2010) adapted from (Hagan, 2010)).
Each type of counterfeiter provides unique challenges for
business product development and product protection
since they operate in different opportunity structure that
likely require different types of responses. Business
decision-makers and researchers might choose to ignore
recreational or occasional counterfeiters in favor of rela-
tively more common adversaries such as occupational or
professional counterfeiters (a decision that should be based
on an analysis of incidents and the fraud opportunity, con-
sidering the magnitude of the economic or public health
impact). Naturally, the scale of the opportunity often helps
prioritize the anti-counterfeiting effort – where a high
number of incidents would warrant more of a focus than a
less frequent event. But a holistic and all-encompassing
perspective requires all types of counterfeiters be at least
considered prior to prioritization. This is essential before
selecting countermeasures.
The scale of the opportunity due is also a function of
how the counterfeiters are organized. For example, ideo-
logical counterfeiters can act as individuals (e.g. rogues,
lone wolves, etc.) or they can be well-organized. The fol-
lowing section details the different types of offender
organizations.Types of offender organizations
Understanding the various types of offender organizations
provides insight to how groups are structured, how they
might be disrupted, and which countermeasures will be
most effective. For years, criminologists have tried to
understand the structure of how criminals organize, for
instance, the differences among criminal associations,
enterprises and clans (Paoli, 1998). What is clear today,
however, is that criminal organizations take no single
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more broadly instead of pointing to specific structures.
For example, it is argued that organized crime groups
need not be large (i.e., a group of two or more can suf-
fice) nor is it necessary for its members (or the crime
they commit) to be part of a larger pre-existing orga-
nized criminal group (Albanese, 2011, Albanese, 2000).
Instead, offender groups may simply be product-driven
(i.e., with little or no group loyalty) and come together
loosely to take advantage of available criminal oppor-
tunities (Albanese, 2011). Similarly, the United Nation’s
2000 Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime defined an organized criminal group as a “struc-
tured group of three or more persons, existing for a
period of and acting in concert with the aim of commit-
ting one or more serious crimes…in order to obtain, dir-
ectly or indirectly, an economic or other material
benefit” (UNICRI, 2008b, UNICRI, 2008a).
These two definitions converge on several broad di-
mensions: organized offender groups may be small or
large; they do not need to have long-term operational
capacity; and they do not have to be part of an estab-
lished or more complex organization.
To assist in developing countermeasures, identifying
the type of offender organization is important in assist-
ing business decision-makers, to classify counterfeit op-
portunity. For example, the counterfeiters’ network and
connections are important regarding the breadth and
depth of potential infringements. A large counterfeiting
organization with manufacturing capabilities and con-
nections to transnational crime groups poses a threat to
distribute counterfeit products on a commercial scale
throughout the world. They also have more access to re-
sources, technologies, and can even have more effective
bribery, or violent measures to support their activities. It
should be assumed that such an organization will not be
stopped by closing one manufacturing plant, closing a
distribution node, arresting one leader, or seizing one
shipping container. Types of offender organizations are
important because they may influence the likelihood of
crime displacement such as adapting to a new target or
method (Eck, 1993; ECK, 2003). For example, larger or-
ganizations have greater capacity and resources which
makes crime displacement a more likely threat to pre-
vention; the opposite is also true where an occasional
criminal with a simple, small offender organization could
be deterred by just a stern warning or a simple overt
packaging countermeasure.
Understanding the types of offender organizations is
critical to predicting what business countermeasures ac-
tually would deter the counterfeiters. There are several
key ways to identify, define, and classify offender orga-
nizations. Each concept provides a different perspective
to help understand the most efficient and effectivecountermeasure. In addition, each term is important since
it is used in law enforcement and prosecution in the US or
around the world (Table 2).
General definition of core group (FBI)
Regarding offender organizations, the U.S. Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) provides the following important
definitions ((FBI, 2012) in (National Intellectual Property
Rights Coordination Center, 2011)).
 Criminal Enterprise: “a group of individuals with an
identified hierarchy, or comparable structure,
engaged in significant criminal activity. … This does
not include the additional elements of violence,
corruption, graft, or extortion necessary to be
considered organized crime.”
 Organized Crime: “…any group having some manner
of a formalized structure and whose primary objective
is to obtain money through illegal activities” and
“maintain[s] their position through the use of actual
or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft,
or extortion.” Traditional organizations such as the
mafia or triads are common examples.
 Members: The individual criminals may be acting
alone but have known ties to the organization and
participate in the illegal activities of the group. An
example is a gang member who separately produces
and sells counterfeit DVDs.
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the ideology of a group and provide financial
support to the criminal organization, but do not
participate in the primary criminal activities of the
organization. An example is a criminal who
contributes funds to a terrorist organization but
does not him or herself, commit terrorist acts.
Specific definition of counterfeiting and piracy group
(IPR Center)
The US National Intellectual Property Rights Center
(IPR Center) is an affiliation of 18 agencies led by the
U.S. Homeland Security Investigations (HSI which was
formerly Immigrations and Customs Enforcement or
ICE). Their focus includes counterfeiting and piracy
since regulatory and statutory boundaries are in intel-
lectual property rights (IP/IPR) crimes and intellectually
property rights infringements. This focus included a re-
port identifying the different types of offenders that are
relevant to intellectual property infringement or prod-
uct counterfeiting and piracy. This also provides insight
to the diverse motivations related to IPR infringement.
The taxonomy builds on the FBI offender organization
terminology. In some cases, the IPR infringement is not
the primary focus of the larger organization. Based on
the FBI taxonomy the specific IP role is noted in paren-
thesis. For example, the perpetrators of IPR crimes in
an organized crime group who pursue IPR crimes out-
side the main operations of their organized crime
groups are classified in the FBI term as members and
the terrorist groups who pursue counterfeiting are clas-
sified as supporters. The member or supporter conducts
their IPR crimes usually with the knowledge of the main
group but the activities are separate. A small group may
be focused only on product counterfeiting whereas it
may be only one of many activities for an organized
crime group. Product counterfeiting may not be a formal
organized crime group activity and the members con-
duct this crime with the knowledge of the organization
but outside oversight. The different types of offender or-
ganizations are presented below (National Intellectual
Property Rights Coordination Center, 2011).
 Individual/ Small Groups: “Although there are IPR
cases involving solo or small groups of individuals
who operate out of their homes, garages, or small
storage facilities, there is little reporting and no
actual analysis of the relative importance of such
operators to the threat. … This lack of reporting and
analysis may be a reflection of the fact that
individuals and small operations are a less attractive
target for law enforcement than larger enterprises
engaging in more significant infringing activity or
also committing other more serious offenses.” General Criminal Enterprises (Members): An
example used to identify this group is “an Asian
criminal enterprise of 30 defendants charged with
smuggling into the United States counterfeit
cigarettes worth approximately $40 million and
other counterfeit goods, including pharmaceuticals
worth several hundred thousand dollars.”
 Organized Crime Members (Members): “Organized
crime groups are a specialized subset of criminal
enterprises that maintain their position through the
use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt public
officials, graft, or extortion. For example, members
of the Lim Organization, an Asian organized crime
group in New York, trafficked in counterfeit goods
and were charged with attempted murder and
conspiracy to commit murder.” An aspect of
deterring this group is the use of violence and the
risk of retaliation to a company or investigators
(e.g., violence or sabotage).
 Terrorist Organizations (Supporters): “Terrorist
supporters have used intellectual property crime as
one method to raise funds. Central to this judgment is
the distinction between terrorist supporters who
merely provide funding and resources to a terrorist
organization versus terrorist organization members
who engage in the actual terrorist activities of
violence. … It is widely reported terrorist supporters
may use IPR crimes to provide indirect financial
support to terrorist organizations, but little current
evidence suggests terrorists are engaging directly in
IPR crimes to fund their activities.” There are many
confirmed cases of product counterfeiting funding
terrorist acts. For example, it was confirmed that the
1993 World Trade Center bombing was partially
funded by the sale of counterfeit products (FBI, 2008).
 Gangs in the United States (Supporters): “According
to the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC),
there are three subtypes of gangs: street gangs,
prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs of these
three groups, street gangs most often engage in and
profit from IP theft, therefore this analysis focuses
exclusively on this subtype.”
 Foreign Government Offenders: The primary
motivation in this offender group is the theft of
sensitive United States information including trade
secrets and economic espionage. There are examples
of state-sponsored counterfeits of branded products.
 Warez Groups: “[A] less common motivation for
committing IPR [infringement] is personal fame and
notoriety. These individuals are often members of
Warez groups, sophisticated and hierarchical
criminal groups operating in the United States and
abroad that specialize in distributing infringing
movies, music, and software via the Internet.”
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Each type of offender organization is focused on gener-
ating profit (except for Warez groups) based on the mar-
gin per unit, the number of units per transaction, and
the number of transactions that can be conducted.
Two key concepts identified by the UN Center for Inter-
national Crime Prevention (UNCICP) are the regional
assessments of criminal markets and structure. Both en-
hance understanding of the IPR Center offender categor-
ies. Markets and structure are important to understanding
where and how product counterfeiting occurs and how to
disrupt the specific activity. The UNCICP report sug-
gested, “A standardized system for examining trends in
transnational organized crime should consist of three
components - that of "groups" who are criminals working
together, "clusters" who are often based in geographic lo-
calities, and "markets" which are organized by products
the produce including distribution, sales, and product sup-
port networks (UNCICP, 2000).
Central ten variables of criminal structure (UNCICP)
The UNCICP report also identifies “Central Ten Vari-
ables” that further define the criminal structure. These
variables are included in a survey tool that can be used
by investigators to create harmonized evaluations of the
criminal structure. Harmonizing the evaluation allows
for evidence- and science-based classification and re-
search. These are very important to business decision-
makers and researchers when selecting or assessing the
effectively of packaging countermeasures.
 Structure: This is the criminals’ degree of hierarchy.
A strictly hierarchical structure could be hurt by the
removal of a single node or leader, whereas a looser
but networked type would simply reform around the
missing node (this type of fluid group is referred to
by some as a swarm). Structure is also important
since it forms the basis for the typologies of criminal
organizations.
 Size: This is the number of associates in a group.
This also includes the resources each associate
brings to the group, such as manufacturing capacity
or technical production capabilities. This is an
important variable when selecting countermeasures
that are effective given the criminal group’s current
set of capabilities.
 Activities: Some groups specialize only in specific
products or actions while others are involved in a
very broad range of products.
 Transborder operations: This variable addresses
organized involvement across national borders. In
some instances, manufacturing may be legal in the
country of origin and only becomes illegal when
products are combined elsewhere. Also, if criminaloperations are in different countries, intelligence
gathering and analysis is much more complicated
and may not identify the crime. Transborder
operations also indicate expertise in moving
products through multiple ports of entry
(e.g. transshipping).
 Identity: This is usually related to a strong ethnic
base but can also include other types of social ties
such as motorcycle gangs.
 Violence: This is the willingness and evidence of a
group’s violence. In the report violence was defined
by “harder evidence of its extent (e.g., numbers of
business people or police officers killed).”
 Corruption: This is an indicator of the group ability
to seek illegal preferential treatment from
governments or agencies. Examples of this could
include empowered officials that protect
manufacturing plants, assure safe passage across
borders, or generally contribute to illegal profit
making activities.
 Political Influence: This variable addresses a group’s
ability to exert influence on governance either in
lawmaking, enforcement, or prosecution.
 Penetration into the Legitimate Economy: If the
associates are involved in the legitimate economy,
they have access to information, components, and
can operate in plain sight. Some of the information
would include detailed insight on the strategies and
activities of customs investigations.
 Cooperation with other Organized Crime Groups:
This is identified by inter-group cooperation in the
base country, outside the country, or both.
Typically, a broader network of strong relationships
correlates to its intelligence and the more options a
group has for manufacturing, distribution, sales, and
protecting the enterprise.
Typology of hierarchy (UNCICP)
The UNCICP report also provides more detail of criminal
group structures and identifies five hierarchical typologies
(UNCICP, 2000). This offers another way to review several
previous concepts with respect to understanding the
opportunity structure of the offender organization and
selecting effective countermeasures.
 Standard hierarchy: Single hierarchical group with
strong internal systems of discipline.
 Regional hierarchy: Hierarchically structured groups,
with strong internal lines of control and discipline,
but with relative autonomy with a geographic region
(which could be transborder since they are defined
by economic infrastructure not national borders).
 Clustered hierarchy: A set of criminal groups which
have established a system of coordination and
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various activities.
 Core group: A relatively tight but unstructured
group, surrounded in some cases by a network of
individuals engaged in criminal activities.
 Criminal network: A loose and fluid network of
persons, often drawing on individuals with particular
skills, who configure themselves around an ongoing
series of criminal projects.
This section reviewed the types of offender organiza-
tions as defined by important enforcement and research
bodies. There are unique opportunities associated with
each type of counterfeiter and offender organization. Each
opportunity poses unique challenges to business decision-
makers as well as researchers who are tasked with protect-
ing products and consumers. An understanding of the
nuance of the offender organizations is important to select
efficient business-based countermeasures.
Defining the types of counterfeiting
It is important to identify the type of counterfeiting threat
prior to selecting or developing effective countermeasures.
Identifying the criminal act, in this case product counter-
feiting is central to Situational Crime Prevention (Clarke,
1997). This section presents the various types of counter-
feiting, related terminology, and important insightsd. A
comprehensive list of counterfeit types includes incidents
that are not routinely associated with counterfeiters such
as theft and over-runs (Table 3). This expands beyond the
common definition of product counterfeiting that is lim-
ited to an IPR infringement perspective focused only on
trademark, patent, or copyright violations. For example,
product theft and over-runs contribute vulnerabilities toTable 3 Types of counterfeiting (Adapted from
(Spink, 2009b, Spink, 2007))
Term Definition
Adulterate A component of the legitimate finished product is
fraudulent
Tamper Legitimate product and package are used in a fraudulent
way
Over-run Legitimate product is made in excess of production
agreements
Theft Legitimate product is stolen and passed off as legitimately
procured
Diversion The sale or distribution of legitimate product outside of
intended markets
Simulation Illegitimate product is designed to look like but not exactly
copy the legitimate product
Counterfeit All aspects of the fraudulent product and package are fully
replicated
Note: In each case, fraudsters may not be following the regulatory definitions
of Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs), Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs), or
Good Hygiene Practices (GHPs).the fraud opportunities. Also, the existence of stolen or
diverted products in a market suggests supply chain vul-
nerabilities and a fraud opportunity for counterfeits to
enter that market. If market supply chains are loose
enough for stolen or diverted goods to enter, then coun-
terfeits or other more dangerous contraband may also
enter (Closs and McGarrell, 2004, Voss et al., 2009). In
addition, counterfeiters often enter a market or channel
with stolen genuine products and later deceive satisfied,
unsuspecting customers by substituting counterfeit prod-
ucts. For these reasons it is important for business
decision-makers and researchers to have a comprehensive
awareness of both existing and potential counterfeit
threats. With definitions of the various types of counter-
feiter, offender organizations, and counterfeits completed,
this paper now addresses potential countermeasures.
Another important distinction for each type of product
counterfeiting is that products could be deceptive or
non-deceptive. Deceptive counterfeit products are pre-
sented in the marketplace as being genuine with the in-
tent to deceive the purchaser. Non-deceptive counterfeit
products are presented in the marketplace as counterfeit
or fraudulent with no intent to deceive the purchaser
(for more information see (OECD, 2007a) or (Spink,
2011)). Non-deceptive counterfeit products are marketed
to consumers who seek counterfeit products such as ap-
parel and luxury goods. Effective countermeasures must
evaluate whether consumers are intending to buy genu-
ine or counterfeit products.
Conclusions
It is important to establish that anti-counterfeit strat-
egies must be based on understanding the nature of the
fraud and the fraudster (Spink, 2011). Product counter-
feiting is a very complex threat that requires perspective
from many disciplines for prevention. The same thought
process is applicable to selecting anti-counterfeiting
brand protection countermeasures. Developing a typ-
ology is common practice in criminology and is no less
important for product counterfeiting. The concepts in
this paper provide the foundation for developing a
method or tool to help organize a complex set of infor-
mation that assists in explaining the opportunity struc-
ture of the problem based on the type of counterfeiting,
counterfeiter, and offender organization. With the fraud,
fraudster, and fraudster organization being defined, an
additional research is required to define the victim. An-
other next step is to define counterfeiting victims and
explore a counterfeiting “victimology.”
Endnotes
aIn earlier publications and presentations, several of the
authors referred to this as the “nature of counterfeiting”.
Environmental criminology emphasizes understanding the
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crime incident, itself. Specifically the focus on the offender
to better identify preventative countermeasures is fun-
damentally opposite of the usual business focus on pack-
aging or corporate security actions (e.g. adding a
hologram, increasing support of customs seizures at the
borders, or investigations to prosecute retailers of counter-
feit product.. The term “nature” is aligned with traditional
criminology theory, which focuses on the factors under-
lying offender motivation, or “why” people commit crime.
bThere is debate about the term “fraudster”. Admit-
tedly the term “offender” is more familiar to criminolo-
gists and does apply. For consistency with the action
defined as product fraud, the offenders are defined as
fraudsters. The original US federal food laws in 1906 fo-
cused on a “fraud jokester” and there have been occa-
sional FDA mentions of product fraud since then. The
term fraudster and fraud has been used by FDA in 2012.
cThis concerns the motivation to commit a counter-
feiting incident and not the motivation to pursue a car-
eer in crime. Exploring further motivations toward
criminality are beyond the scope of this paper.
dCriminology theory often refers to this as “technique”
rather than “type”.
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